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INTRODUCTION
There have been concerns about land degradation and many other problems 
associated with agricultural production in the communal lands (areas) of Zimbabwe. 
Concern over high stocking rates of livestock, “overgrazing”, and what was perceived 
as a low level of productivity in peasant farming areas was first expressed by 
government officials in the 1920s and has over the years involved several attempts to 
restructure land use settlement patterns (Cousins, 1988). These attempts include 
the introduction of grazing schemes.
Grazing schemes are interventions aimed at, firstly, improving livestock productivity 
in communal areas, and secondly, conserving the vegetation cover of grazing land 
and reducing the risk of irreversible environmental degradation (Cousins, 1988). It 
was assumed that the low productivity was due to poor management, both of stock 
and rangeland feed resources, and that the high stocking rates caused severe land 
degradation. In general, grazing schemes in the Zimbabwe communal areas aim to 
control stock numbers, restrict access to communal rangeland by means of fences, 
and manage the rangeland by means of rotational resting systems. Grazing schemes 
have involved the modification of traditional tenure rules and the development of a 
new kind of resource management institution, the committee. Sometimes 
management decisions and procedures are embodied in sets of by-laws, formally 
written down and officially sanctioned or else informally held in the memories of 
community members. They are an example of the evolution of common property 
management systems.
Grazing schemes have not been assured of success. It has been reported that most 
problems that have hampered grazing schemes relate to governance. In Southern 
Africa, governance trends reveal a shift towards decentralizing decision-making 
structures and processes (Ntshona, 2000). Within the natural resource management 
sector, most countries of the region have erhbarked on processes of decentralization. 
This has been seen in the development of local institutions. Decentralisation is 
aimed at enhancing local governance and awarding communities greater control over 
the management of the valuable natural capital of the region. Before changes in the 
governance of grazing schemes are proposed, it is necessary to conduct in-depth 
studies on the weaknesses and strengths of grazing schemes that were established 
hitherto. The lessons learnt could be valuable in deciding on the best models to try in 
the future.
In this paper principles of good governance, and governance structures and issues of 
grazing schemes that have been documented will be presented. In addition, 
governance structures and issues, and case studies predominantly from Masvingo 
Province will be analysed based on the principles of good governance. Masvingo
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Province was selected for study because of the abundance of grazing schemes and 
the importance of livestock in the farming systems.
Analytical Framework
Cousins (1993) suggested modifications to the Oakerson modei for the analysis of 
common property management. Cousins’s model describes the interplay between (i) 
ecological and technical characteristics (ii) socio-economic structure and iii) power 
structures and institutional arrangements to produce (iv) patterns of interaction and 
struggie and (v) outcomes.
The modei has an element of key actors in recognition of the complexity of political 
dynamics at work in common property situations and the consequent need to clearly 
identify the agents engaging in interaction and struggie. This paper is not about 
model validation. We, however, acknowledge that the success of a grazing scheme 
or any common property (outcome) is the result of sound ecological settings and 
technical management as well as an effective governance system. For this paper's 
objectives, we will mainly address the power structures and institutional 
arrangements component of the model.
Principles of Good Governance
The design principles for sustainability of community based natural resource 
management (Ostrom, 1990) will be used to evaluate the effectiveness of grazing 
scheme governance. These principles are:
1. d e a r ly  d e fin e d  b o u n d aries : individuals or households who have rights to 
withdraw resource units from the common property resource (CPR) must be 
clearly defined, as must be the boundaries of the CPR itself.
2. C o n g ru e n c e  b e tw e e n  appro p ria tio n  a n d  prov is ion  ru ies  a n d  lo c a l conditions: 
appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, and quantity of 
resource units are related to iocai conditions and to provision rules requiring 
labour material and/or money.
3. C o llec tive  ch o ice  a rra n g e m e n ts : most individuals affected by the operational 
rules can participate in modifying the operational rules.
4. M onito ring  o f  c o m m o n  property resource conditions and appropriate 
behaviour: monitors who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator 
behaviour are accountable to the appropriators or are the appropriators.
5. G ra d u a te d  sanctions: appropriators who violate operational ruies are iikeiy to 
be assessed graduated sanctions -  depending on the seriousness and 
context of the offence -  by other appropriators, by officials accountable to 
these appropriators, or by both.
6. C on flic t resolution mechanisms: appropriators and their officials have access 
to low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts.
7. M in im a l reco g n itio n  o f  rights to  o rg an ize : the righis of appropriators to devise 
their own institutions are not challenged by external government authorities.
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8. N e s te d  en terp rises : appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict 
resolution, and governance activities are organized in multiple layers of 
nested enterprises.
These principles could be used to evaluate governance structures and the general 
governance of grazing schemes that have been studied in Masvingo province and 
elsewhere in Zimbabwe.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES
Historically, governance structures in grazing land and schemes have involved 
traditional, local and external authorities. The extent of involvement of these different 
authorities varied over the historical periods in Zimbabwe (pre-coioniai, colonial and 
post-independence period) as reported by Cousins (1992a; 1996).
Pre-coioniai period
Cousins (1992a, 1996) reported that there was no general agreement as to the 
nature of pre-colonial land tenure and resource management systems in Zimbabwe. 
However, according to Hughes (1974) (cited by Cousins, 1996) in the “traditional” 
society, general rights to land were acquired by virtue of membership to a community 
and from this flowed more specific rights to what the community considered to be 
“the reasonable use of natural resources available to the community”. One of these 
rights was the "Right of Pasture” which allowed individuals to herd their livestock on 
community grazing land. The community as a whole owned the grazing land and any 
member of the community had all the rights for grazing her animals, in this system, 
there was no strict limitation of an individual’s utilization of the resource and the 
individual was not accountable for management of the grazing land.
The system was not one of free and open access to resources because the group 
regulated the rights and claims of each in such a way as to obtain their entire share 
of the common benefits. There was thus a considerable degree of individual 
security, guaranteed by accepted membership of a community. However, such 
membership involved obligations as well as rights and the allocation of land rights 
functioned also as a mechanism of social control.
The iand holding community consisted of a hierarchy of land communities: the village 
or kraal (m u s h a ) within the tribal ward (d u n h u ), the tribal ward within the chiefdom 
{ny ika ). Membership within the community depended upon acceptance by traditional 
authority at all these levels, but specific allocations of land for cropping or grazing 
livestock were made at lower levels, e ith e r  a t  the tribal ward o r  th e  kraal. The tribal 
ward was the most important territorial community and rivers, streams or hilltops 
marked its boundaries (Cousins, 1996).
According to Cousins (1992a) there was no institutionalized management of grazing 
land. The Shona people possibly operated a pastoral transhumance system. There 
is some evidence of the existence of a grazing management system in the pre­
colonial Ndebele kingdom in which herds of livestock were moved from the “sourveld" 
in the wet season down to “sweetveld” areas in the dry season. It can be surmised 
that traditional authority was responsible for sanctioning any such movements. It is 
likely that land and grazing resources were abundant and that the decision to move
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livestock from “sourveid” to “sweetveid” and vice  v e rs a  was based on the body 
condition of the livestock. Livestock would be moved when body condition began 
deteriorating.
Little or nothing remains of this pre-colonial rangeland management systems 
because of the impact of conquest, settler rule and successive state interventions 
during the colonial era.
Analysis o f governance in the pre-colonial period
The pre-colonial system of grazing management described by Cousins (1996) 
indicates the predominant role of the tribal authority, the existence of internal 
regulation, sharing of common benefits and implied usufruct rights to iand and 
resources. The pre-colonial systems appeared to satisfy most of the principles 
of good governance of grazing management systems, it could be argued that 
the existence of accepted kraal and tribal wand boundaries constituted defined 
boundaries, which could have been respected in the use grazing resources. 
The movement of livestock from “sourveid” to “sweetveld” and vice-versa is 
evidence that the community accepted that grazing land in use had to be within 
a prescribed locus. This would afford all grazing areas some rest during the 
year. Self-evaluative mechanisms as in the modem sense require some formal 
arrangements with regard to, for example, frequency of meetings, leadership 
accountability and representation of local interest. Such arrangements would 
not have been refined but existed in the pre-colonial era. For example, Cousins 
(1996) reported that the allocation of land rights to individuals functioned as a 
mechanism of social control. The ultimate authority of the tribal leaders could be 
used to deal with cases of abuse of resources.
Adjudications by tribal leaders were based on consensus and consultation, 
initially, with some form of confidential kitchen cabinet (the council of elders) -  
on whom they relied for advice (Mbigi, 1997: 27). If the chief could not 
convince the council of elders, he could only go against their advice through 
broader consensus and legitimacy by taking the issue for consensus to the 
people through a village assembly. The chief was a link with the ancestral spirits 
'whose help could be relied upon in times of crisis. Good governance required 
the avoidance of confrontation and a focus on political accommodation, 
compromise and tolerance. Freedom of expression, bread consultation and 
democracy were essential elements of good governance. The preservation of 
good governance institutions and traditions was more important than charismatic 
individual leaders.
Coioniai Era
Concern over the high stocking rates on grazing iand in communal lands and 
overgrazing was expressed in the 1920s. When persuasion to take up the 
recommended measures failed to achieve the desired resuits, the coioniai state 
resorted to coercion. Several acts and policies were adopted, including the 
Centralisation Policy of Aivord, the National Land Husbandry Act of 1951, and the 
Natural Resources Board regulations of 1945 (Cousins 1992a). These acts and 
policies were intended to foster correct use of arabie and grazing land and control 
livestock numbers. They succeeded in generating a deep-seated resistance to 
interventions of this nature and souring of relations between the state and the
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peasantry. In the late 1960s a belated return to the principle of voluntary acceptance
led to a certain degree of success.
Grazing schemes in the 1970s (Colonial era)
Grazing schemes were introduced with the intention of using the principle of 
short duration grazing. The approach was to persuade and not ooerce 
communal farmers to adopt grazing schemes. Land was demarcated into arable 
and grazing, and boundaries agreed with the chief, headman and surrounding 
kraalheads. Grazing lands were further demarcated into at least five paddocks, 
and plans allowed for stock routes to dips and kraals, and made provisions for 
existing and potential water supplies and sites for homesteads. Voluntary 
committees were set up to run the schemes. The participants were trained to 
keep records and manage finances. Levies for fencing and fines for grazing the 
wrong paddocks were charged. The grazing schemes collapsed partly due to 
the effects of population growth. Cousins (1987) also reported that as time grew 
on, society became increasingly dominated by the liberation struggle and as the 
state came increasingly under attack, government sponsored programmes such 
as grazing schemes stood little chance of surviving.
Analysis o f governance in the colonial period
What is clear about governance during the colonial period was the heavy hand 
of central government, except in the 1970s. There was hardly any evidence of 
collective choice arrangements, minimal recognition of rights to organize, and 
appropriate monitoring. In general, sanctions were not considered graduated, 
with excessive penalties for menial offences. The colonial authorities virtually 
negated the central role of traditional leaders and the consensus and genuine 
consultation that was inherent in traditional governance. The numerous acts 
passed during the colonial era is evidence of the excessive use of legislation as 
an instrument to solve problems pertaining to management of communal arable 
and grazing land. The colonial approach to the management of arable and 
grazing areas had a few governance strengths. Boundaries of operation and 
community beneficiaries were defined. To some extent nested enterprises were 
in existence.
The attempts to plan the use of land and implement grazing schemes during the 
colonial era created deep-rooted suspicions on the intentions of central 
authority. Forced destocking left a sour taste in communal lands and to this day 
it is difficult to get correct figures on household livestock herd sizes from those 
aware of the de-stocking history. The resistance mounted by communal farmers 
to interventions on land use, introduced by central government during the 
colonial era, have made external, local and democratically elected authorities 
over-cautious on issues related land use and distribution. Up to today, the 
definition of grazing scheme boundaries and stock limits may immediately evoke 
a sense of coercion reminiscent of the colonial authority. These suspicions and 
resistance have been observed in densely populated areas; where ironically 
there is the greatest need to arrest environmental degradation.
In the 1970s the according of some rights to traditional leaders to allocate land 
and decide how it should be used was recognition of the need for some internal 
regulation in the communal lands. External influence from central government
CSA Occasional Paper Series - 2/2001 5
was, however, still present since District Commissioners had overall control over 
land allocation. The importance of this change was that central government had 
recognized the need for internal regulation, collective action and defining of 
boundaries by the communities. The ultimate power given to the District
Commissioners to allocate land left some suspicions on the genuineness of 
devolution of power to local leaders. The general perception was that only local 
leaders who were pawns of the District Commissioners could allocate land and 
only as directed by the District Commissioners. The approach taken by 
extension workers in the establishment of grazing schemes in the 1970s of 
persuading rather than coercing communities was then novel. These schemes 
were a success, perhaps because of the approach of soliciting voluntary 
participation, community management, cooperation of the traditional authority 
and desisting from employing forced destocking (Cousins, 1992a). These 
factors conform to Ostrom's principles that relate to internal regulation, collective 
choice arrangements and clear criteria for membership.
The Post-Independence Period
The ending of the liberation war in 1980 saw order returning to the countryside, and 
the extension staff again began promoting grazing schemes. Cousins (1992a) citing 
other authors reported that government policies after independence manifested much 
continuity with those of the pre-independence era. In addition, some of the problems 
encountered in the implementation of grazing schemes had their origins in the muted 
but nevertheless strongly felt resistance by rural producers to state interventions in 
the locally evolved system of land use, patterns of settlement and tenure. The 
government of Zimbabwe made several policy changes with regard to land tenure. 
Notable was the Communal Land Act of 1982.
The Communal Land Act
The Communal Land Act of 1982 deprived Tribal Land Authorities of the powers 
to allocate land in communal lands. This responsibility was transferred to district 
councils. Despite this 6ct, there was confusion regarding who was responsible 
for land allocation.
In 1984 the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe instituted a new structure of 
development planning. This structure consisted of Village Development 
Committees (VIDCOs), Ward Development Committees (WADCOs), Rural 
District Councils (RDCs) and Provincial Councils headed by Provincial 
Governors. The ward became the planning unit and the Ward Chairperson was 
an RDC Councillor. Boundaries of VIDCOs were delineated without regard to 
natural resource endowments, for example, grazing lands used by different 
villages. Village and ward committees took over the role to allocate land from 
traditional leaders. Although traditional leaders continued to be recognized, their 
authority was seriously eroded.
The Communal Land by-laws of 1985 demonstrated the desire by the 
government of Zimbabwe to have land use in communal areas controlled by 
district councils. Regarding livestock, they stated that councils could specify the 
maximum number of livestock that may be grazed. Councils could also require 
owners to reduce their stock. Planned areas could be declared and persons 
who were not members of communities within these areas could be prohibited
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traditional ieaders. Central government gave RDCs powers to control the use of 
grazing and land resources. The RDCs and their associated non-traditional 
ieaders, through their relevant institutions, were given responsibilities for 
allocating land and grazing resources but they did not have as much knowledge 
of these resources as the traditional ieaders.
An array of external organizations was involved in the establishment of grazing 
schemes. This brought in additional actors to the scenario. External donor 
agents had conditions that had to be met for funds to be donated and funding 
renewed. Extension agents were involved, and they advocated an approach to 
grazing scheme governance of persuasion and tolerance, to the extent of 
underplaying the limiting of stock numbers to match grazing resources available, 
a fundamental requirement for ecological success of schemes. Thus there was 
little congruence of appropriation and provision rules and local conditions. It is 
probably true that the multiple actors involved created some confusion among 
farmers in relation to the governance of grazing schemes.
In terms of the principles of good governance, there was evidence of defined 
boundaries, clearly defined community and project beneficiaries, and clear 
criteria for membership. At least the iegai framework appeared to provide for
this.
Collective choice arrangements, including the devolution of responsibility and 
rights to the community were rather limited, ostensibly due to the land and 
grazing resource allocation powers given to local government institutions and 
the need to satisfy donor conditions. It is often argued that grazing schemes 
were started and governed through collective action, kfowever, the freedom 
accorded a community to make choices was often circumscribed within the laws 
of local government and donor conditions.
Definition of clear and impiementable self-evaiuative mechanisms, with 
leadership accountability and representation of local interest appeared to be 
inadequate. The iocai leadership, especiaiiy the non-traditional ieaders were not 
always accountable to the community. Monitoring and conflict-resolution 
mechanisms were weak. Conflicts between the different leadership groups did 
not foster the establishment of nested enterprises.
Numerous case studies were conducted in several regions in Zimbabwe during 
the post-independence period. Governance in these schemes was varied. 
These case studies can serve to illustrate the governance strengths and 
weaknesses discussed in this analysis.
CASE STUDIES FROM THE POST-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD
i hree case studies and the experience of one non-govemmentai organization will be 
described to highlight some governance issues.
1. Chamatamba Grazing Scheme
Cousins (1992b; 1993a) described a case study of Chamatamba Grazing Scheme in 
Mhondoro Communal Area, Mashonaland West Province, Zimbabwe. This scheme
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was widely regarded as a rural development “success story” having won the National 
Conservation Prize in 1987 plus others. The community consisted of five villages or 
kraais. Two members in the grazing scheme committee represented each village, in 
addition, the kraalhead and his assistant represented each kraal. Thus the grazing 
scheme committee combined two sources of legitimate authority: the traditional 
leadership an d some notion of representative democracy involving election of the two 
Committee members by the community. However, cattle wealthy members of the 
community dominated decision-making.
Very few general meetings of the whole community were held and those that were 
held were poorly attended. Decisions were communicated to residents by word of 
mouth through the kraaiheads or their assistants. As the scheme progressed from 
1983 to 199C fewer general meetings were held, and there was disillusionment and 
internal strains within the leadership group. Members of two villages began 
expressing resentment at the poor commitment of members from other kraals. No 
attempt was made to invoke by-laws of any kind.
There was no formal written set of grazing by-iaws. Some informants interviewed in 
1989-1990 including committee members said that they believed a constitution might 
exisi but they had never actually seen it. Informants expressed very different views 
on the issue of what sanctions could be used to enforce deferred grazing rest. No 
fines were reported to have been imposed between August 1988 and November! 990 
for instance, despite numerous cases of violation of grazing restrictions.
There was ambiguity on boundary lines to the northwest between Chamatamba and 
Chirata kraal. This may have contributed to the blurring of the social boundary 
between the two kraais.
There were important external agents in the area including AGRITEX field staff, 
Forestry Commission, Natural Resources Board, Cold Storage Commission, and 
Local Government officials, the District Administrator and the Local Rural District 
Council (RDC).
Analysis of Governance in Chamatamba
There was some evidence of internal regulation, defined boundaries, and defined 
community and project beneficiaries. However, the absence of by-laws would 
compromise internal regulation in the scheme, especially imposition of sanctions and 
conflict resolution. Although the boundary line with Chirata kraal was obscure, the 
kraai boundaries delineated the radius of operation. By defining the radius of 
operation it was implied that residents of the participating kraals would be the 
beneficiaries of the scheme.
The domination of the scheme by wealthy members couid not allow adequate 
collective choice arrangements, including the devolution of responsibility and rights to 
the community. Proven success of the leadership of ihe wealthy members in 
bringing development funding into the community was some source of support. The 
presence of external agents, such as the Coia Storage Commission whose interest 
was increasing cattle off-take for slaughter, could have promoted the legitimacy and 
lational importance of the activities (e.g., pen fattening) of cattle wealthy members, 
he wealthy members of Chamatamba even welcomed Chirata members whose 
ctive participation in the pen-fattening ventures was more important than that of 
ether herd owners within Chamatamba. The poor attendance of meetings and work
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sessions reported may have reflected a low ievei form of resistance to the leadership 
by the community at large. It is possible that the community felt powerless to 
influence any change of direction of the scheme because of the dominance of the 
wealthy members.
It is apparent that there were limited dear, impiementabie seif-evaiuative 
mechanisms (e.g., in the form or regular meetings) with leadership accountability and 
representation of locai interest. Domination by the “power elite'- would suggest 
limited representation of local interest. The balancing role of traditional leaders in 
situations of this nature was not obvious in this scheme.
Although the Chamatamba Grazing Scheme was regarded as “successful”, there are 
numerous weaknesses in its governance that may adversely affect sustainability of 
the scheme, it wouid be of interest to check whether this scheme withstood the test 
of time.
2. Mutakwa Grazing Scheme
Cousins (1990) reported on the Mutakwa Grazing Scheme, which is situated in 
Zimuto Communal land in Masvingo Province of Zimbabwe. This scheme had a long 
history of state interventions into rangeiand management, it was typical of the fuiiy 
funded and fenced schemes in which AGRITEX played a major role in planning, 
management and drawing up of by-iaws. Mutakwa grazing scheme was an example 
of a “failed” scheme.
in the iate 1980s the two major sources of authority were kraaiheads and a grazing 
scheme committee. The relationship between the two sources of authority was a 
troubled one. When the grazing scheme was revived after independence a 
committee was elected. However, in January 1988 a new committee was elected 
because the previous chairperson and treasurer were aiiegediy not effective.
A standard set of grazing scheme by-laws, drawn up by AGRITEX, were signed by 
the grazing scheme committee as a pre-condition for receiving assistance from the 
then European Economic Community (EEC), but the contents of these were not 
widely known within the community. The by-laws contained the threat of removal of 
fencing materials if AGRiTEX recommendations were not complied with. An 
alternative set of loosely formulated rules agreed at a committee meeting was more 
widely but unevenly known. These by-iaws included ruies on the use of ihe correct 
paddock in the planned rotation, the prohibition of fence cutting and the collection of 
humus from the paddocks, control of tree felling, and paying a fine for being absent 
from work sessions.
In 1987 there seemed to be very little knowledge of the existence or nature of the by­
laws among the committee members. In the period that followed there was no 
attempt by extension staff to fulfil their regulatory function as laid down by the by­
laws. It proved difficult for the committee to enforce even the locally agreed by-laws. 
The Locai RDC did not formally adopt the modei by-laws.
The grazing scheme committee was by and iarge composed of the cattle wealthy in 
Mutakwa. Apart from the grazing scheme committee and the two kraaiheads, there 
were other institutions concerned with the development to be considered. The
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V1DC0 was an extremeiy weak body and was aimost completely inactive. The iocai 
councillor too had no effective presence within the community.
There was a fair degree of overlap in the composition of the various committees. For 
example, the past chairman, the vice chairman, the treasurer and the secretary of the 
grazing scheme committee were aii on the committee of the farmers’ ciub. The 
secretary and other two female members of the committee were leading members of 
a women’s knitting cooperative. Respondents generaiiy gave as a reason for ihe 
election of these individuals their willingness to lead and be active on behalf of the 
community. This stratum of ieadership might be said to have constituted a local 
“power elite” composed mostly of petty commodity producers (Cousins, 1996:382).
There was conflict between the grazing scheme committee and one of the two 
kraalheads over when the vlei (a key grazing resource) should be closed off and 
when it shouid be re-opened. The decision to dose the viei in the wet season wouid 
be made by the grazing scheme committee and yet the kraalhead would make the 
decision to open it without consulting the committee.
Another probiem was the iocationai unevenness in the spread of benefits, which 
resulted in tensions between the members of the two kraals. The grazing scheme 
faiied to co-opt the authority of the kraaiheads. The iocai perception was that the 
important inequities were locational and kraal-based rather than wealth or class 
related. People on the west of the scheme had iess easy access to this resource, 
and as a result their herds often crossed the ill-defined boundaries in search of vlei 
grazing outside the scheme.
Conflicts and tensions within the community appeared to result, to a much greater 
extent, from the mismatch between technology and ecological dynamics.
Analysis of governance in Mutakwa
There was some evidence of defined boundaries, and defined community and project 
beneficiaries. Since the two kraals defined the radius of operation, it was implied that 
residents of the participating kraais wouid be the beneficiaries of the scheme.
Collective choice arrangements were inadequate. The inequities in access to the 
grazing which arose due to different locations of the kraals may have been resolved if 
there had been effective collective choice arrangements, conflict resolution 
mechanisms and graduated sanctions. Leadership accountability and representation 
of iocai interest appeared deficient.
The weak involvement of the iocai non-traditionai ieaders did not bring legitimacy to 
the scheme and local government authority. The kraalhead who was in conflict with 
the grazing scheme committee may have been sympathetic to ihe interests of 
his subordinates. It is probable that decisions in the grazing schemes were not by 
consensus.
The failure of AGRITEX to enforce the by-laws with regard to donated materials 
suggests that without internal regulation and nested enterprises external agents 
would not have a conduit for enforcement. The grazing scheme committee could not 
use the influence of traditional leaders to enforce or govern the scheme.
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3. World Vision Assisted Grazing Schemes
Paradza (1990) reported on some grazing schemes in which Worid Vision was 
involved. World Vision would open dialogue after being invited by the community, it’s 
representatives or locai government authorities, if Worid Vision approved the project, 
a community development committee of 12 members would be democratically 
selected at a general meeting observed by counciiiors, and representatives from the 
District Administrator’s Office and Worid Vision. The community would select the 
committee and inclusion of members of already existing management institutions 
such as VIDCOs, WADCOs, and traditional and religious leaders was left to the 
discretion of the community.
Paradza (1990) further reported that in many cases ine community development 
committee was a blend of the traditional and non-traditional (e g., VIDCO) leadership. 
Ordinary influential villagers found on the committee included teachers and 
headmasters. The committee was then assisted to draw up a constitution that stated 
the objects of the project. A project monitor based in the community would help with 
documentation and basic bookkeeping. The committee was expected to meet 
regularly, usually once or twice a month.
Apart from the community development committee there was a grazing scheme 
management committee. This committee’s main function was to organize various 
tasks related to ine grazing scheme. Some of the members sat on the 
community development committee and gave reports to this committee on matters to 
do with the grazing scheme. Members of the grazing scheme management 
committee would continually consult councillors and traditional leaders for support on 
socio-political and socio-cuiiurai matters related to the grazing scheme. Non-stock 
owners participated in making the grazing schemes operational and in so doing 
guaranteed their rights of access to the schemes as soon as they acquired stock of 
their own.
Aii the nine projects assisted by Worid Vision had agreed to the use of by-laws as a 
tool for managing the grazing schemes. AGRITEX normally assisted in putting these 
by-iaws in writing, in 1990 the by-iaws were related to attendance of work during 
fencing, cash contributions to the scheme and vandalism of project fences. Very few 
cases of imposed fines iaid down in these by-iaws were experienced in the projects. 
Emphasis was put on methods of persuasion and appealing to reason instead of the 
imposition of sanctions on those who breached the by-iaws. it was reported that in 
most cases this approach worked as indicated by good attendance at fencing 
sessions.
The community as a whole owned the grazing land and any member of the 
community had all the rights to graze his animals. There was no strict limit on an 
individual’s utilization of the grazing resource and the individual was not accountable 
for the management of the grazing land. It only became a collective responsibility 
through village and ward structures. An informal survey conducted by Worid Vision 
in all the nine schemes it assisted revealed that the objectives of the scheme were 
not clearly articulated by target groups. The temptation to fall back to the traditional 
system of grazing was great.
incidents of conflicts with neighbouring communities over issues of exclusive rights to 
grazing land were experienced in almost all schemes. Cutting and lowering of fences 
and poaching of grazing in the schemes were mainly experienced in two re-
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settlement communities where parts of the grazing scheme boundaries were shared 
with adjacent communal lands. Gumbeze Grazing Scheme in Mount Darwin was 
devoid of external conflict because it was surrounded by residential and arabie land, 
thereby excluding other communities. Members of the schemes were not necessarily 
influenced by the existing political and traditional institutions since a democratic 
election of members was carried out.
Analysis of governance in the World Vision assisted grazing schemes
Whiie there was insufficient information to evaluate governance in the schemes 
assisted by World Vision, the model adopted by World Vision attempts to satisfy most 
of Ostrorrrs principles of good governance. The moaei incorporated collective choice 
arrangements and clear self-evaluative mechanisms. In addition, the boundaries of 
operation, ihe community and project beneficiaries and criteria for membership were 
clearly defined.
The uniqueness of the model was the democratic election of members of a 
community into the committees without regard to leadership in the community. In 
other schemes traditional and non-traditionai iocai government leadership were co­
opted, ex officio, into grazing scheme committees. The two-tiered committee 
structure was aiso of interest and is an attempt at establishing nested enterprises. 
The community development project committee would probably provide a higher 
piatform where issues unresolved by the grazing scheme management committee 
could be discussed and resolved. The model did not disregard the influence of 
traditional and non-traditionai iocai government leaders because the committees 
consulted them on some issues. The inclusion of every member of the communities, 
including the stoekless, promoted participation by the whole community and 
collective choice arrangements.
The emphasis on persuasion and appealing to reason rather than enforcement of by­
laws was a compromise between enforcement and total negation of the by-laws. 
This approach wouid probably be successful where there is some cohesiveness and 
self-evaluative mechanisms within the community. The conflicts with neighbouring 
communities, which were not in the schemes, suggest some disagreement on the 
legality of boundaries. Perhaps traditional and local government authorities could 
have resolved such an issue. The conflict may have arisen from the perception that 
grazing lands in communal and resettlement areas are open access resources rather 
than common property resources with community boundaries. Guveya and Gwata 
(1998) conducted PRA exercises in Mhondoro-Ngezi and Svosve Communal lands, 
and collected survey data from Chiduku and Buhera communal lands of Zimbabwe to 
examine grazing utilization in the communal areas of Zimbabwe. They reported that 
there was open access to grazing resource use in the communal areas of Zimbabwe. 
They made this conclusion on the basis of the following: There were no boundary 
rules, although households and communities knew the boundaries of their 
communities and grazing areas. The rights to community grazing areas were thus 
pooriy defined in terms of excluding outsiders. There were no sanctions for grazing 
animals in grazing areas of other communities.
Grazing schemes operate within prescribed boundaries and the beneficiaries are 
often defined. Unless there is consensus on exclusivity of grazing areas and 
penalties in the event of violation, conflicts between the grazing schemes and those 
outside the schemes will remain. We were not able to establish whether the World 
Vision assisted schemes are stiii operational and how its model has fared.
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CASE STUDIES OF GRAZING SCHEMES IN MASViNGO PROVINCE 
IN THE YEAR 2000
We interviewed committee and ordinary members in three grazing schemes Razi 
(Chivi District), Segande (Gutu District) and Mafucha (Masvingo District), which were 
regarded as "successful”, “failed” and “totally faiied”, respectively.
1. Razi Grazing Scheme
Razi scheme was resuscitated by AGRiTEX in the iate 1980s and has received 
assistance from the Lutheran World Federation. The scheme was fenced in the 
1980s, was planned by AGRiTEX, and iater adopted the holistic resource 
management approach. It has a dam with fish, which does not dry up during the dry 
season. Heifer Project international and ihe Lutheran Worid Federation have been 
assisting the area. Heifer Project International has provided heifers to the farmers. 
Lutheran World Federation donated a pump for a small irrigation plot in the scheme. 
The scheme has a constitution (with by-laws), which was drawn up with the 
assistance of extension agents. Committee members are neither traditional nor non- 
traditional (VIDCO) leaders. The scheme is for two kraals. The kraalheads deal with 
inter-kraal conflicts. The councillor’s input was not evident.
Analysis of Governance in Razi Scheme
There is evidence of the existence of some structures for collective choice 
arrangements and defined boundaries of operation. The election of the grazing 
scheme committee appeared to be democratic and none of the traditional and non- 
traditional local government leaders were appointed ex officio. However, it was 
reported that there was good rapport between the grazing scheme committee and 
the two kraalheads.
By-iaws that would have facilitated intemai regulation were drawn up at the 
beginning of the scheme. However, these by-laws were not enforced. There were 
cases of poaching of fish by members of the scheme and outsiders. The perimeter 
fence was down and footpaths were being created without control. Paddocks were 
no ionger being grazed in an orderiy manner as in the pasi. There were some 
attempts to enforce the by-laws when armed rangers from the Department of 
National Parks were called in to scare away poachers. This only worked for a few 
months.
in general, members of the community believe that the scheme is taking a downward 
turn. The members believe that the current chairman who was voted into office in 
1995 is rather weak and has not followed up on a lot of issues. Examples of his 
ineptitude were failure to attend to the fences, which had been broken at several 
points, and lack of initiative to raise funds to purchase diesel for the irrigation pump 
donated by the Lutheran World Federation. The community members were 
concerned that women were still carrying buckets of water on their heads when the 
pump had been lying idle for one and ahalf years. Members of the community also 
blamed the development agents for not assisting by pushing for action. The general 
belief was that members of the community had elected the current chairman because 
he is “soft” and does not bother or push people. However, it was evident that there
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was weak institutional support for the constitution and by-iaws. in-fact, the by-iaws 
had not been ratified by the local rural district council.
There was iittie definition of the scheme beneficiaries, criteria for membership, and 
self-evaluative mechanisms. Although it could be assumed that members in the two 
kraais constituting the community wouia be the beneficiaries, there was no dear 
provision for new families, gender issues were not well articulated and there was, in 
general, no provision for the wider social catchment. Members of the community 
complained that since the incumbent chairman was elected there had been no
annual general meeting. There was, therefore, no platform creaied for the evaluation 
of the scheme by the members and for the leadership to account to the members. 
Prior to the election of the current chairman, Razi grazing scheme was considered to 
be a success, with vibrant intra-community dialogue and policing of the scheme by 
iocai “policemen". it appears that the recent demise of the scheme may have been 
partly due to “weak” leadership, but perhaps more so the absence of some authority 
to enforce adherence to the constitution. Annual general meetings create a forum for 
fresh elections and an opportunity for audit of activities by the members of the 
community.
2. Segande Grazing Scheme
The scheme was established in the mid-1980s through donor and AGRiTEX 
assistance. The GTZ funded CARD programme was the major sponsor of the 
scheme. A grazing scheme committee runs the scheme. A constitution that was 
prescribed by the donor and AGRITEX is available. Two kraals (Taderera and 
Dauramanzi) participate in the scheme.
The members of the community elect committee members. The current chairman 
does not own cattle. Land boundaries are defined. Community members provide 
their own iabour for the repair and maintenance of fences. The role of the traditional 
and non-traditional local government leaders was not clear.
Analysis of governance in the Seaande scheme
There was some evidence of internal regulation, collective choice arrangements, 
defined boundaries of operation, and defined community and project beneficiaries. 
This scheme was unique because a non-cattle owner was elected to chair the 
committee. The impression created is that there is some sense of membership and 
criteria for membership to the scheme. The constitution and by-laws did not originate 
from the community. The rather minimal involvement of traditional and non- 
traditional leaders negated a source of sanctioning powers that would have been 
useful. While this scheme had some acceptable governance structures, ecologically 
it was not regarded as a success.
There was little evidence of the existence of self evaluative mechanisms. In general, 
meetings (e.g., annual general meetings) were no longer regular. Members of the 
community were unhappy about this. However, the content of the constitution was 
not public knowledge in the scheme.
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3. Mafuzha Grazing Scheme
This scheme is situated in the Zimuto Communal land of Masvingo District. The 
scheme started in 1983 as one of the European Union (EU) funded pilot grazing 
schemes. The beneficiary community was Mafuzha kraai. Mafuzha was one of the 
four pilot grazing schemes in Zimuto. The design or layout of the scheme was done 
by AGRiTEX. The EU supplied the fencing materials and the community provided 
the labour to erect fences.
The objectives of the scheme were to rehabilitate the veid, minimize soii erosion and 
increase veld production through rotational grazing. The constitution was drawn up 
by AGRiTEX and then given to the community. Members of the community and 
AGRITEX conceded that the constitution had never been instituted effectively. 
Ordinary members of the community were elected to form a committee. The 
kraalhead and local councillor were not members of this committee. All households 
in the community were members of the scheme by default. No cash contributions 
were made by the members.
The benefit, which was initially realized by the community, was that herding of cattle 
was no longer necessary. However, the fence is no longer in place. The members 
of the scheme reported that for several years the fence was lying on the ground. 
During our visit there was hardly any remnants of the barbed wire and the poles.
The scheme has been beset with problems for years. This scheme, in our opinion, 
has completely failed. The general condition of the grazing area has not improved. 
The soils have remained sandy and poor. There is heavy invasion by weeds such as 
Helichrysum. People in the area have been collecting leaf litter from the grazing area 
for fertilizing their crops thereby depriving the grazing land of useful organic matter.
Farmers in one section of the community are reluctant to drive their cattle to the 
furthest paddock. There is no effective control of exploitation of the resources in the 
grazing area. The kraalhead has not shown interest in the project. Some members 
of the community we interviewed felt that the kraalhead is too weak and has no 
effective control of development. This accusation was rather surprising since there 
was supposed to be a committee running the scheme.
Analysis of governance in Mafuzha Grazing Schem e
in this scheme the boundaries and beneficiaries were clearly defined and 
circumscribed within the community. However, it would appear that the scheme has 
degenerated into an open access and not a common property regime. The remainder 
of the good governance principles listed at the beginning of this paper were hardly 
satisfied. The non-involvement of the kraalhead and local government authorities 
(e g., councillors) are probably most notable. These leaders could have buttressed 
efforts or the powers that the grazing scheme committee may have had. The sense 
of ownership of the scheme may not have been engendered at the onset because all 
the financial inputs were from outside the scheme. It is not clear whether this 
community ever requested for the grazing scheme and help from AGRITEX in 
designing the constitution and management plan.
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CONCLUSION
Governance in most grazing schemes in Zimbabwe has been deficient in collective 
choice arrangements, congruence between appropriation and provision rules and 
local conditions, definition of scheme beneficiaries, monitoring, conflict resolution 
mechanisms, graduated sanctions and establishment of nested enterprises. During 
the pre-colonial period grazing resources were abundant and governance was 
through traditional leaders, often with consensus among members of the council of 
eiders or the village assembly. The ability of the traditional authority structure to 
manage common property resources during the colonial era was seriously eroded by 
their co-option into the colonial administration as part of a strategy of indirect rule. 
These authority systems could not function effectively in land and resource 
management when the tenure status of the land had changed to state ownership.
Local traditional authorities had usufructural rights only and powers of exclusion and 
access to certain natural resources (e.g., wildlife) were denied them (Murphree, 
1991). There was, therefore, excessive control by central government to the 
detriment of internal regulation. In this era, enforcement of the laws governing use of 
grazing resources was the emphasis. It is only during the late colonial period that 
voluntary participation of farmers and collective choice arrangements were honoured.
The post independence period was characterised by central government creating 
new local government structures such as VIDCOs and WADCOs. There was an 
influx of donor agencies who came to assist some grazing schemes. The new local 
government leaders, in some instances, conflicted with traditional leaders. The 
insistence on democratic representation and formulation of a constitution by most 
donors created new conditions for grazing schemes. Internal regulation, collective 
choice arrangements and self-evaluation mechanisms were put in place, although 
these were not always honoured. Definition of boundaries, community and project 
beneficiaries and criteria for membership became sore points, because during the 
colonial era grazing land in communal lands had degenerated from common property 
to open access.
Grazing schemes that were established in Masvingo and other provinces 
encountered these problems apart from the power structure problem. Our recent 
studies of three grazing schemes in Masvingo suggest that governance* of grazing 
schemes is still a major problem. These problems are likely to get worse if there is 
no institutional support, especially after withdrawal of donor support. There is a 
serious need to strengthen and harmonise the roles of traditional and political leaders 
in grazing schemes.
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